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Rural nonfarm employmentRecent evidence shows that many Sub-Saharan African farmers use modern inputs, but there is limited
information on how these inputs are financed. We use recent nationally representative data from four
countries to explore input financing and the role of credit therein. A number of our results contradict
‘‘conventional wisdom” found in the literature. Our results consistently show that traditional credit
use, formal or informal, is extremely low (across credit type, country, crop and farm size categories).
Instead, farmers primarily finance modern input purchases with cash from nonfarm activities and crop
sales. Tied output-labor arrangements (which have received little empirical treatment in the literature)
appear to be the only form of credit relatively widely used for farming.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
It is generally accepted that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) farmers
often have low yields which could be increased, all else equal if they
bought more ‘‘external inputs” (chemical fertilizer, pesticides, and
seeds). Moreover, it is often asserted after liberalization and priva-
tization dismantled many government farm credit programs in the
1990s (Kherallah et al., 2002), that small farmers face severe credit
constraints and that this is a cause of low use of external inputs
(Kelly et al., 2003; Morris et al., 2007; Poulton et al., 1998, 2006).
Yet Sheahan and Barrett (2014) find that SSA farmers now pur-
chase more external inputs than in the 1990s, and much more than
is generally asserted in the debate. Farmers are thus financing
inputs somehow. Is it by credit? If so what kind? Is it by own cash
sources from crop sales and labor sales? These issues lead us to the
three research questions we address here: (1) how do farmers
finance input purchases? (2) Is there a correlation between finance
source and farm size and thus ‘‘inclusiveness” of the financial
arrangement used? (3) Is there a relation with crop type and thus
relation to cash crop versus food crops?
To derive hypotheses for these questions, we briefly review the
literature concerning the potential finance sources for inputs.
First, government credit was common before the 1990s for both
farmers producing cereals as well as export cash crops. The
schemes generated fiscal deficits and suffered frequent non-
recovery, considered ‘‘strategic default” used by farmers as de facto
insurance after bad harvests (Poulton et al., 1998). These schemeswere generally dismantled in the 1990s and 2000s during Struc-
tural Adjustment. We hypothesize that few farmers use govern-
ment credit now.
Second, government subsidies to farmers to buy fertilizer were
common before Structural Adjustment. The subsidy was adminis-
tered as a reduction of fertilizer price, or as a coupon to farmers
(as a direct transfer). Many input subsidy programs were elimi-
nated by Structural Adjustment. However, in several SSA countries
they were partially revived in the mid-2000s on the heels of con-
cerns that fertilizer use had dropped since Structural Adjustment.
Malawi and Tanzania governments provide many farmers a cou-
pon for fertilizer sufficient for an acre. The Nigerian government
had a subsidy scheme during our study period (20102012) but
our analysis showed only 5% of the farmers bought fertilizer from
government sources that disbursed the subsidy.
Third, private-sector banks tend, according to much of the liter-
ature, to lend little to farmers (Poulton et al., 1998, 2010). The rea-
sons given are that banks face high transaction costs in rural areas,
farmers tend to lack collateral, and lending is risky because recov-
ery rates are low (Dorward et al., 2009). We hypothesize that few
farmers obtain bank credit, but those that do are larger farmers
(based on work by Zeller and Sharma (1998) in Cameroon, Ghana,
Madagascar, and Malawi).
Fourth, informal credit from friends and family and local
moneylenders is often presented as a significant source of funds
for farmers to buy inputs and consumption items (Poulton et al.,
2006; Zeller and Sharma, 1998). Our hypothesis is thus that infor-
mal credit is important to all strata of farmers.
Fifth, finance from ‘‘tied output-credit” or ‘‘interlinked credit”
arrangements (Bardhan, 1980; Poulton et al., 1998) involve an out-http://
2 S.G. Adjognon et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxput buyer or input seller advancing the farmer cash for inputs or
inputs in kind at the start of the season, and being reimbursed from
the farmer’s harvest. The literature presents this in two categories.
The first category is tied output credit from processing or export
companies for traditional export cash crops as well as for non-
traditional crops like horticulture. The literature is ambiguous as
to the occurrence of this. On the one hand, a number of studies
especially of particular schemes document this arrangement. On
the other hand, some studies note that processing and export com-
panies may not use this arrangement frequently or apply it to all
farmers because they fear farmers will ‘‘side sell” (to other buyers)
or because there is a dearth of effective farmer cooperatives to
enforce repayment among their members (Shepherd and Farolfi,
1999; Poulton et al., 1998, 2010; Chao-Béroff, 2014).
The second category is interlinked credit from grain wholesalers
and input dealers. This is commonly posited to be important in
Asia (Bardhan, 1980; Conning and Udry, 2007) and in some reports
hypothesized to be common in SSA (Pearce, 2003; Zeller and
Sharma, 1998).
In both cases farmers enter these ‘‘tied” arrangements princi-
pally because formal credit markets idiosyncratically fail for them,
and thus these are ‘‘second best” arrangements (Binswanger and
Rosenzweig, 1986). We hypothesize that empirical analysis will
show that such arrangements are common in SSA, perhaps with
a bias toward traditional cash crops.
A variant on the above is a tied output-labor market arrange-
ment where farm workers advance labor in exchange for payment
(typically in kind but can be in cash) at harvest (Bardhan, 1984).
While discussion of this was common in the South Asia literature
in the 1970s/1980s, to our knowledge it has not been examined
empirically in SSA. We hypothesize that it exists in SSA. One justi-
fication for this expectation is that labor by one household provided
to another is monitored and upheld by local norms/customs and
social pressure.
Sixth, household retained earnings such as from rural nonfarm
employment and crop sales are in principle candidates for poten-
tial liquidity sources for farmers to buy inputs. Indeed,
Haggblade et al. (2010) note that rural nonfarm income (RNFI) is
a main cash source of rural households in SSA, and Reardon et al.
(1994) and Davis et al. (2009) hypothesize that RNFI is a key cash
source and determinant for input purchases, especially in the face
of idiosyncratic failure of credit markets. Yet the empirical litera-
ture rarely compares household own-cash sources with credit as
potential liquidity sources for farmers to buy inputs. Zeller and
Sharma (1998) note that the literature on farm credit is largely
independent of the literature on farm household income sources.
However, several studies in SSA provide evidence of the role of
RNFI as a finance source for investments of rural households.
Aryeetey (1997) provides evidence of the latter for Ghana for rural
microenterprises but not for agriculture. Some work has shown the
impact of RNFI on external input use by African farmers (e.g.,
Savadogo et al. (1994) for animal traction in Burkina Faso; Clay
et al. (1998) and Oseni and Winters (2009) for fertilizer in Nigeria
and Rwanda), and for Asia (e.g., Stampini and Davis (2009) for
purchased seeds in Vietnam); some work has shown the effects
of off-farm income on farm productivity (such as Rozelle et al.,
1999 for China). We thus hypothesize that own cash sources are
a significant determinant of input purchases.
The aim of this paper is to examine the above hypotheses and
thereby ‘‘update the landscape” of knowledge of SSA farm house-
holds’ sources of finance for external inputs. To our knowledge,
there has been no such survey-based analysis especially over coun-
tries using recent and nationally representative data. We analyze
recent (20102012) LSMS data sets comprising 11,000 farm
households in Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda.Please cite this article in press as: Adjognon, S.G., et al. Agricultural input credit
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.014The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses data and
sampling. Section 3 descriptively examines the purchase of ‘‘exter-
nal inputs” and use of credit sources for those purchases, as well as
cash income sources. The analysis stratifies by country, farm size,
and crop type (using the triad of crop categories in the SSA litera-
ture: traditional export crops, non-traditional commercial crops
such as horticulture, and staple food grains). Section 3 focuses on
Nigeria to econometrically test for the effects of different cash
sources on fertilizer demand. The analysis uses panel data estima-
tion techniques to more consistently identify the effect of RNFI on
fertilizer demand by accounting for unobserved time invariant
household characteristics likely to affect participation in non-
farm activities and fertilizer demand. As far as we are aware, there
are no other studies that have used nationally representative panel
data to explore the effect of non-farm activities on input demand.
Most of the older literature (cited above) focused on qualitative
analysis, comparison of means and ordinary least square (OLS)
estimations that are potentially biased (e.g., Ellis and Freeman,
2004). More recent empirical work such as Oseni and Winters
(2009) use cross sectional data while Smale et al. (2016) use panel
data but do not use a nationally representative sample (they focus
on one maize producing region of Kenya).2. Data
We use data from the Living Standard Measurement Study
(LSMS) household panel surveys in four countries. The most recent
years of the panels are used for the descriptive analysis in all the
countries, and the most recent two years for the econometrics
analysis in Nigeria. The sets are as follows: (a) the Malawi Inte-
grated Household Panel Survey (IHPS) of 2012/2013, with 3219
farm households; (b) the second wave of the Nigeria Living Stan-
dard Measurement Study – Integrated Survey on Agriculture
(LSMS-ISA) Panel for two years, 2010/2011 and 2012/2013, cover-
ing 3000 farm households; (c) the Tanzania National Panel Survey
2012/2013, covering 3047 farm households; and (d) the Uganda
National Panel Survey 2010/2011 covering 2109 farm households.
The surveys differ somewhat in the specific questions they use to
elicit information on the variables of interest. We treat the survey
datasets as uniformly as possible to ensure that the information is
comparable. Where one set or the other lacks some information we
note that in the table notes.
In general, the surveys used a two-stage sample design. In the
first stage, enumeration areas were selected in each district of
the country. Within each enumeration area a listing of households
was done for the sample frame. A random sample of households
was drawn from that frame. We selected only households doing
any farming. In the analyses, we use sampling weights from the
datasets to account for the survey design and construct nationally
representative statistics. The weight for each household is the
inverse of the probability of being selected based on the sample
frame structure.
The data used are on farm households’ use of inputs and cash
and in-kind arrangements to pay for them. The analysis is done
by crop, household, and plot. The data also have characteristics
of the farm households such as nonfarm income, crops sales, loans
received, and farm size.3. Descriptive analysis of cropping and input purchases
3.1. Patterns in cropping
Table 1 shows crop composition by country and farm size
strata. Crops are classified into sets: crops traditionally called ‘‘foodin Sub-Saharan Africa: Telling myth from facts. Food Policy (2016), http://
Table 1
Share of households producing key cash and food crops across farm size strata. Source:
Authors from LSMS data.
Crop types Farm size strata (ha) Share of farms with crop (%)
Malawi Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
Cash crops
0–0.49 4 10 4 26
0.5–0.99 18 10 8 34
1–1.99 39 11 11 39
2–4.99 49 20 14 46
5+ 28 14 18 54
All 17 11 11 37
Food crops
Grains
0–0.49 98 69 61 70
0.5–0.99 99 87 74 83
1–1.99 99 86 79 86
2–4.99 99 84 83 81
5+ 100 88 85 81
All 99 77 76 80
Horticulture
0–0.49 29 33 22 55
0.5–0.99 31 21 13 50
1–1.99 37 22 12 48
2–4.99 32 23 9 46
5+ 43 17 7 63
All 31 28 13 51
Legumes
0–0.49 62 29 12 76
0.5–0.99 76 56 10 75
1–1.99 79 60 12 77
2–4.99 77 53 16 82
5+ 93 54 16 82
All 71 42 13 78
Tubers
0–0.49 8 61 16 74
0.5–0.99 9 30 19 79
1–1.99 14 34 19 74
2–4.99 16 39 18 76
5+ 0 49 20 71
All 10 48 18 75
All food crops
0–0.49 100 98 95 100
0.5–0.99 100 98 97 99
1–1.99 100 99 96 100
2–4.99 100 98 95 100
5+ 100 99 97 99
All 100 98 96 100
Table 2
Share of farm households who purchase external inputs. Source: Authors from LSMS
data
Countries Farm Households buying
external inputs (%)
Farm Households (%) by type of
external inputs purchased
Fertilizers Pesticides Seeds
Malawi 70 49 4 51
Nigeria 71 42 38 29
Tanzania 18 8 13 NA
Uganda 16 5 14 NA
Note: NA means information is unavailable in the dataset.
1 They covered Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda.
2 There is no explicit question in the Nigeria LSMS for whether a household got a
fertilizer subsidy. However, until recently, only the government sold subsidized
fertilizer; thus we assume that farmers buying from government sources are the only
ones getting a subsidy (based on Takeshima and Nkonya, 2014). While this might be
an underestimate in 2012 (since it was possible starting in 2012 for farmers to
purchase subsidized fertilizer from dealers in the market with a coupon) this is
unlikely since the new program was still very new (launched in 2012). We find the
very low numbers (and a tiny share) of farmers purchasing fertilizer from government
sources in 2012 to be similar to those in 2010 (when the government was the sole
distributor of fertilizer).
S.G. Adjognon et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 3crops” (although they are often also sold for cash), including grains,
horticulture products, legumes, and tubers (grown as a staple), and
crops traditionally called ‘‘cash crops”, including tobacco, cotton,
tea/coffee, and edible oil crops.
Several points stand out. First, as expected, grain farming dom-
inates, but is not ubiquitous, as it is practiced by only about three-
quarters of the farms in Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda, being near
100% only in Malawi. There is little farm size bias in participation
in food cropping. Over the countries on average nearly a third of
the farms grow horticultural crops, half grow beans/pulses, and a
third grow tubers. Food cropping is thus fairly diversified on
average.
Second, by contrast, cropping of traditional cash crops is more
concentrated in every country. On average, only a fifth of farmers
grow traditional cash crops, and that is but a tenth if one excludes
Uganda. There is a marked correlation of the share of farms pro-
ducing any cash crop and farm size. The crop focus differs over
countries, with tea/coffee and oil crops standing out in Uganda,
cotton and oil crops in Tanzania, oil crops in Nigeria, and tobacco
and cotton in Malawi.Please cite this article in press as: Adjognon, S.G., et al. Agricultural input credit
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.0143.2. Patterns in input purchases
Table 2 shows farmers’ purchases of ‘‘external inputs” – variable
inputs apart from labor, including inorganic fertilizer, seeds, and
pesticides.
First, there is a marked contrast between Nigeria and Malawi,
with a high share of farmers buying external inputs (70%), com-
pared to Uganda and Tanzania (16% and 18% respectively). The
Malawi-Nigeria results are at odds with the traditional notion that
few farmers in SSA use external inputs but consistent with the
findings of Sheahan and Barrett (2014).1
One might say that the Nigeria and Malawi results are driven by
the fertilizer subsidy program. While that might be true in Malawi
where about 60% of households receive subsidized fertilizer
(Chirwa and Dorward, 2013), this is unlikely in the case of Nigeria.
While the Nigeria data show persistently high fertilizer use rates
across both survey years rounds, in 2010, when subsidized fertil-
izer was only channeled through the government, fewer than 5%
of the households who purchased fertilizer bought it from govern-
ment sources (the channel by which the subsidy was delivered).2
Second, among farm households buying external inputs, fertil-
izer and seeds are common purchases. The results are mixed for
pesticides. Many farmers buy pesticides in Nigeria, but not in
Malawi. Only about a half and a third of the farmers who buy
external inputs in Tanzania and Uganda buy fertilizer, yet a larger
share buy pesticides; this appears surprising, but is consistent with
Sheahan and Barrett (2014) for Uganda.
Table 3 disaggregates input purchases over five strata, very
small farmers (with less than 0.5 ha) to larger farmers with more
than 5 ha. Several points are salient.
First, across the countries and contrary to conventional percep-
tions, farmland is concentrated. We find 65–75% of the land but
only 20–25% of the farms in the medium and large farm strata
(above 2 ha). Small farmers of less than 2 ha have only 25–35% of
the land but 75–80% of the farms in Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda;
in Malawi the farms above two hectares are only 4% of the farms
but nearly 40% of the land.
Second, surprisingly, the shares of farmers buying external
inputs do not differ much over small (up to 2 ha) versus med-
ium/large (above 2 ha): in Malawi, 71% versus 88%, Nigeria, 78 ver-
sus 83%, Tanzania, 15% versus 23%, and for Uganda, 14% versus 24%.
But this masks differences in rates, or level of external input usein Sub-Saharan Africa: Telling myth from facts. Food Policy (2016), http://
Table 3
Purchase of external inputs by farm size strata. Source: LSMS data.
Farm
strata (ha)
Farms in
stratum (%)
Farmland in
stratum (%)
Farms buying
external inputs (%)
Fertilizer bought by
stratum (%)
Pesticides bought by
stratum (%)
Seed bought by
stratum (%)
Total inputs bought by
stratum (%)
Malawi
0–0.49 45 13 65 30 12 28 30
0.5–0.99 33 24 69 21 11 34 22
1–1.99 18 24 79 29 40 23 29
2–4.99 4 11 91 19 30 13 19
5+ 0 27 84 1 7 2 1
Overall 100 100 100 100 100 100
Nigeria
0–0.49 53 8 62 30 19 55 30
0.5–0.99 20 12 78 25 20 17 23
1–1.99 15 16 83 23 24 13 22
2–4.99 9 22 82 16 21 8 16
5+ 3 43 85 5 16 7 8
Overall 100 100 100 100 100 100
Tanzania
0–0.49 20 2 13 5 5 NA 5
0.5–0.99 19 5 14 9 7 NA 9
1–1.99 24 14 17 20 13 NA 19
2–4.99 26 32 22 41 46 NA 42
5+ 11 47 24 25 29 NA 26
Overall 100 100 100 100 NA 100
Uganda
0–0.49 26 4 6 6 5 NA 5
0.5–0.99 24 10 16 9 10 NA 10
1–1.99 26 20 20 35 48 NA 44
2–4.99 19 30 20 34 25 NA 28
5+ 6 37 28 16 12 NA 14
Note: NA, information unavailable in the dataset.
External inputs include fertilizer, seeds and pesticides.
4 S.G. Adjognon et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxper hectare. Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) note that one should
expect smaller farms to use more external inputs as substitute
for land. Our data indeed show smaller farmers using more exter-
nal inputs per hectare than do the medium/large farms: while
medium/large farmers crop 70% of total farmland, they constitute
only 35% of the external input purchase ‘‘pie”. This finding varies
little over input types. It also holds true across Malawi, Nigeria,
and Uganda. The outlier is Tanzania, where medium/large farms
use external inputs almost as intensively as small farms.3.3. Farm input finance by farm size strata and crop categories
Table 4 shows consistent evidence across countries of very low
use of any form of credit to buy external inputs. On average, among
farm households who bought external inputs, only about 6% used
any form of credit. As noted in the introduction, there has been a
presumption in the literature that to the extent farmers buy exter-
nal inputs, they do it at least with informal credit or trader credit.
But the analysis here shows that conventional wisdom is not sup-
ported empirically, and it is not just a lack of formal credit, but aTable 4
Share of households purchasing external inputs that finance the purchase on credit.
Source: Authors from LSMS data.
Of those who bought
external inputs, share
buying on credit (%)
Of those who bought the noted
input, share who bought on credit
by input type
Fertilizers Pesticides Seeds
Malawi 5 5 7 3
Nigeria 3 2 NA 3
Tanzania 11 14 7 3
Uganda 6 14 4 NA
Note: NA implies information unavailable in the dataset.
Column 2 is the share among households who purchased at least one external
input.
Please cite this article in press as: Adjognon, S.G., et al. Agricultural input credit
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.014near absence of the use of any credit, formal or informal, tied with
input or output traders, in kind or in cash. The converse is that 94%
use only their own cash to buy external inputs. This can be from
sales of crops and employment earnings (farm wage labor, migra-
tion, and RNFI), as discussed in more detail below.
Moreover, among the tiny share of farmers buying external
inputs on credit, there is sharp variation over input types. There
tends to be 2–3 times more households getting some kind of credit
for fertilizer compared to seeds or pesticides.
Table 5a shows the shares of the farm size strata in all credit-
based input expenditures. In Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda, input
credit is roughly correlated with farm size – most of the credit-
based external input expenditures are concentrated outside the
below-one-hectare group. These results do not differ much over
input types. Nigeria has the lowest share of farmers purchasing
external inputs on credit (3%); it differs somewhat from the other
countries in that the great majority of the input credit is taken by
the ‘‘under 1 ha” group; however, this is still taken by merely a tiny
share of the smallest farmers.
Table 5b shows the share of each external input’s expenditure
that a given stratum buys with credit. Input credit tends to be
much more important for the middle to higher farm size strata,
and extremely little for the smaller strata. It is also mainly in fertil-
izer and very little in pesticides and seeds. In Malawi, Tanzania,
and Uganda, input credit is relatively substantial only for fertilizer.
It averages 9% of fertilizer input outlay in Malawi but is concen-
trated in the upper-small and medium farmers (1–5 ha) where it
averages a fifth of external input expenditure. In Tanzania, the
share of input expenditure done on credit is correlated with land
size, with about 10% for smaller farmers and about a quarter and
a half for medium and larger farmers. For Uganda, it is only rela-
tively important for the 1–5 ha group, where it reaches 40–50%
of fertilizer expenditure. In Nigeria, the share is low for all types
of external inputs, with about 3% on average, differing little over
strata.in Sub-Saharan Africa: Telling myth from facts. Food Policy (2016), http://
Table 5a
Credit-based expenditure on external inputs, by shares of strata. Source: from LSMS data.
Countries Farm size strata Buying on
credit (%)
In all credit-based
fertilizer outlay
In all credit-based
pesticide outlay
In all credit-based
seed outlay
In all credit-based
input outlay
Malawi
0–0.49 3 4 11 13 4
0.5–0.99 3 4 15 16 4
1–1.99 10 61 38 44 60
2–4.99 10 32 36 27 32
5+ 14 0 0 0 0
Overall 100 100 100 100
Nigeria
0–0.49 3 49 NA 13 45
0.5–0.99 5 22 NA 22 22
1–1.99 4 11 NA 62 16
2–4.99 1 2 NA 0 2
5+ 6 16 NA 3 14
Overall 100 NA 100 100
Tanzania
0–0.49 2 0 0 NA 0
0.5–0.99 6 4 3 NA 4
1–1.99 8 10 15 NA 10
2–4.99 20 36 69 NA 38
5+ 24 50 12 NA 48
Overall 100 100 NA 100
Uganda
0–0.49 0 0 0 NA 0
0.5–0.99 2 3 17 NA 5
1–1.99 11 57 54 NA 56
2–4.99 11 40 28 NA 39
5+ 0 0 0 NA 0
Overall 100 100 NA 100
Note: NA implies information unavailable from dataset.
Column 3 pertains to farm households buying at least one external input.
Table 5b
Share of credit-based outlay in overall outlay per external input. Source: from LSMS data.
Countries Farm size strata Credit-based outlay in
total fertilizer outlay (%)
Credit-based outlay in
total pesticide outlay (%)
Credit-based outlay
in total seed outlay (%)
Credit-based outlay in
total ext. input outlay (%)
Malawi
0–0.49 1 3 2 1
0.5–0.99 2 5 2 2
1–1.99 22 4 8 21
2–4.99 18 4 8 17
5+ 0 0 0 0
Nigeria
0–0.49 6 NA 1 4
0.5–0.99 3 NA 3 3
1–1.99 2 NA 12 2
2–4.99 1 NA 0 0
5+ 11 NA 1 5
Tanzania
0–0.49 2 0 NA 2
0.5–0.99 12 4 NA 11
1–1.99 15 10 NA 14
2–4.99 26 12 NA 23
5+ 58 3 NA 48
Uganda
0–0.49 0 0 NA 0
0.5–0.99 12 3 NA 6
1–1.99 53 2 NA 17
2–4.99 40 2 NA 19
5+ 0 0 NA 0
Note: NA implies information unavailable in the dataset.
Column 3 is among households who purchased at least one external input.
S.G. Adjognon et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 53.4. Finance by crop type with an added focus on interlinked credit
Conventional perceptions from the literature, as discussed in
the introduction, suggest that farmers growing traditional cash
crops would commonly access external inputs on credit, in partic-Please cite this article in press as: Adjognon, S.G., et al. Agricultural input credit
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.014ular from processors in interlinked credit arrangements; food crop
producers also may access such interlinked credit from traders. To
test this, we explore the shares (by crop type) of farm plots on
which inputs purchased on credit in interlinked relations are
shown (Table 6). The findings are surprising.in Sub-Saharan Africa: Telling myth from facts. Food Policy (2016), http://
Table 6
Share of plots on which external inputs purchased with interlinked credit, by crop
type. Source: from LSMS data.
Malawi Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
Cash crops
Tobacco 16 NA 87 81
Cotton 11 8 11 0
Tea/coffee NA NA 22 1
Oil crops 6 3 4 11
All cash crops 14 4 26 8
Food crops
Grains 5 3 11 7
Horticulture 4 3 0 4
Legumes 5 2 11 6
Tubers 7 3 4 5
All food crops 5 3 10 6
NA implies information unavailable in dataset.
Table 7
Shares of farmers using harvest to reimburse input credit. Source: Generated by
authors using LSMS data.
Countries Farm size strata Share of farmers
using their harvest
to repay labor
received on credit
(%)
Share of farmers using
their harvest to repay
external inputs
received on credit (%)
Malawi
0–0.49 37 1
0.5–0.99 45 3
1–1.99 50 2
2–4.99 47 1
5+ 24 0
All 42 1.8
Nigeria
0–0.49 26 1
0.5–0.99 29 1
1–1.99 26 3
2–4.99 21 2
5+ 22 3
All 26 1.4
Tanzania
0–0.49 NA 0
0.5–0.99 NA 1
1–1.99 NA 1
2–4.99 NA 4
5+ NA 5
All NA 1.9
Uganda
0–0.49 54 NA
0.5–0.99 63 NA
1–1.99 74 NA
2–4.99 78 NA
5+ 81 NA
All 68 NA
Notes: NA implies that information is unavailable in the dataset used.
6 S.G. Adjognon et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxFirst, while there is a lot of variation over countries, the average
over all traditional cash crops is only 13%, lower than what would
be expected from the literature on cash crops that suggests a wide
distribution of interlinked credit for cash croppers. This average
masks variation over countries. Malawi and Tanzania average
20% (the share, among all plots for this crop category, that receiv-
ing inputs purchased in interlinked credit arrangements). Nigeria
and Uganda average only 6%.
The difference between the pairs of countries is mainly driven
by tobacco in Tanzania and Uganda, where four-fifths of the plots
are grown with inputs bought on credit from the processors. Also,
that outlier is composed of a tiny group of tobacco farmers in the
sample for each country, about 1% of the total sample. The limited
and ‘‘enclave” nature of tobacco farming and its correlation with
farm size in those countries could explain why these are the main
cases where the conventional image of contract-farming related
credit is manifest. Removing the tobacco outlier (for just Tanzania
and Uganda) puts the overall credit share for cash crops about 6% –
very close to that for food crops as noted below.
Second, only 6% of all plots of food crops receive inputs pur-
chased in interlinked credit arrangements. This is the first time
in the literature this has been tested and demonstrated, and we
consider this a key contribution of this paper.
To triangulate the above results on output/input credit arrange-
ments, we examined the data in another section of the LSMS sur-
vey questionnaire, the management of crop harvests. We used
farmers’ responses concerning use of part of their harvests to repay
advances for inputs from input or output traders and processors
(especially for cash crops) for external inputs, and for labor.
Table 7 shows the share of farmers using part of their harvests
for these ends. The main finding is that such ‘‘tied credit” is very
rare for external inputs (fewer than 2% of the farmers) across all
study countries. This corroborates the results from above. For har-
vest payment for external inputs, the shares are so small that there
are no interesting inter-strata differences. When we consider the
‘‘reimbursement of credit with the harvest” by type of crop, it is
very minor or zero for the other cash crops (except tobacco in Tan-
zania, discussed above), and all of the food crops (Table 8).
By contrast, and reported for the first time in the SSA literature
using cross-country surveys for comparison, we find that labor-
output tying is much more common, with as many as 42% of the
farmers in Malawi, 26% of Nigerian, and 68% of Tanzanian farmers
doing this practice. (The dataset for Uganda did not allow this cal-
culation.)3 The patterns over strata differ by country. In Uganda, the
share rises with farm size, in Nigeria it slightly declines, and in3 Of interest (but not reported in Table 7) is that tying land access and output
markets was not found to be common. That is, the land tenure section of the surveys
showed that sharecropping was extremely limited.
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one cannot say that this traditional-tying of labor and harvest is
more a phenomenon of the smallest farmers holding on to an old
practice, as one might expect, given our hypothesis that larger farms
aremore apt to usemonetized labor relations only. Moreover, Table 8
shows that use of harvest repayment for labor is very minor for cash
crops (except for oil crops in Uganda where it is a quarter of farmers
using it), but is significant in food crops across the countries, such as
about a third in horticulture and a quarter in grains. There is only a
single situation (crop plus country) where this arrangement (using
harvest to pay for inputs) is important for external inputs, and that
is for tobacco in Tanzania. This corroborates the results from above.
We conjecture that this high prevalence of the use of harvest to
reimburse for external inputs received on credit to produce
tobacco in Tanzania is related to a widespread use of contract
farming arrangement over tobacco production in Tanzania. If our
conjecture is true, we should expect to see more contract farming
(outgrower) arrangements over tobacco compared to cotton, tea/-
coffee, and oil crops. But in the Tanzania data set,4 we found that
only 1.8% of farmers are involved in outgrower schemes. In this tiny
set, tobacco farmers dominate (as 78% of the plots in outgrower
schemes are under tobacco, followed by cotton with 19%.
Overall our results indicate that there is much less tied credit
arrangement to finance external input than expected from the con-
jectures in the literature. Even though those arrangements appear
to be more formal (from contract farming arrangements) and more
likely for cash crops, we still see far less than expected (except for
tobacco).4 There is no information about contract farming in the datasets of the other
countries to allow us to compare this pattern across countries.
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Table 8
Financing inputs on credit with harvest across key cash and food crops. Source: Generated by authors using LSMS data.
Crops types Share of plots where harvest is used to repay (advanced) labor (%) Share of plots where harvest is used to repay external inputs (%)
Nigeria Malawi Uganda Tanzania Nigeria Malawi Uganda Tanzania
Cash crops
Tobacco 0 2 0 NA 0 2 NA 79
Cotton 10 0 0 NA 0 1 NA 6
Tea/coffee NA NA 1 NA NA NA NA 3
Oil crops 8 0 25 NA 0 0 NA 0
Food crops
Grains 17 22 27 NA 1 1 NA 1
Horticulture 18 32 36 NA 1 0 NA 0
Legumes 9 21 25 NA 1 1 NA 0
Tubers 5 29 30 NA 1 1 NA 0
Notes: NA implies that information is unavailable in the dataset used.
S.G. Adjognon et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 73.5. Households’ use of loans not specifically linked to input
transactions
We use the term ‘‘loans” for credit unconnected directly and
specifically to transactions of outputs or inputs. Loans can come
from formal sources (banks), semi-formal sources (micro-
finance), and informal sources (friends, relatives, cooperatives,
etc.). The survey data show that households take loans, but rarely
for agriculture. In Nigeria 38% of the farmers took loans (but there
is no information in the survey on the purpose of the loan). In
Malawi, 23% of the households took a loan, but only 5% of them
did so for farming. In Tanzania, only 11% took loans, of which 2%
for farming. This is striking because one would expect credit-
constrained farmers to use these loans to finance farm input pur-
chases. For Uganda the survey did not report loans.
Instead, the data show that the loans were taken mainly for
nonfarm business startups and non-farm enterprise inputs (40%
in Malawi, 24% in Tanzania) and for food consumption (31% in
Malawi and Tanzania).5 As our regressions show below, a key factor
that determines fertilizer purchase is engaging in nonfarm enter-
prises. Thus it appears that farmers prefer to use loans to finance
the set up/expansion of their nonfarm enterprises but use the gener-
ated cash from these nonfarm enterprises to finance external input
purchases for their farms.4. Determinants of fertilizer purchases in Nigeria
This section infers how farmers finance their input purchase by
estimating the determinants of fertilizer purchases by Nigerian
farmers. Our analysis emphasizes the roles of the main cash
sources of farm households, including RNFI (from both wage and
self-employment), crop sales, and loans, in rapidly descending
order of importance. We also control for agricultural productivity
risks (captured by zone rainfall variability), as well as regional dif-
ferences (north versus south) in decisions on fertilizer purchase.
We focus on the Nigeria case to abstract from possible issues of
the fertilizer subsidy directly driving fertilizer purchase, which
could be an issue if we were to do the analysis on Malawi and Tan-
zania as noted above.6 We use the two available waves (for 2010
and 2012) of The Nigeria Living Standard Measurement Study-5 Zeller and Sharma (1998) also found that 50–90% of formal and informal loans in
their African study countries went to consumption-related purchases. Poulton et al.
(2010) also make this point in a general way.
6 Even in 2012, when it was possible that farmers purchased subsidized fertilizer
from agro-dealers in the private market less than 5% of farmers could have done so.
According to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development about 1.6
million farmers participated in the government subsidy program in 2012 (FMARD,
2015). According to the LSMS-ISA surveys, there were over 32.5 million households in
Nigeria in 2012. Even if we assume the program only allowed 1 participant per
household, this would amount to about 5% of farmers.
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the nationally representative dataset used in previous sections.4.1. Conceptual and empirical framework
The fertilizer purchase decision follows a standard input
demand function derived from a constrained household utility
maximization problem (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). Fertilizer
demand can be expressed as a function of output and input prices,
risk proxies, complementary and substitute farm capital, and rele-
vant shifter variables such as crop type. We consider the decision
to purchase fertilizer and then the intensity of use.
In each case
Yit ¼ f ðXit ;uitÞ
where Yit refers to the binary input use variable or the quantity of
fertilizer purchased (in kg), while Xit refers to a vector of controls
that explain fertilizer demand. uit ¼ eijit þ ci is a composite error
term comprising time invariant unobservable heterogeneity (ci)
and time varying unobserved characteristics eit of our input demand
function. We model the farmer’s fertilizer purchase decisions using
the standard unobserved effects binary dependent variable model
(Green, 2000; Wooldridge, 2010). The intensity of fertilizer use is
modeled using the unobserved effects Tobit model to account for
the corner solution nature of the dependent variable (Wooldridge,
2010). In both models, ci represents the unobserved effect parame-
ter, modeled using the Mundlak (1978) special case of the approach
of Chamberlain (1982) called correlated random effects (CRE):
ci ¼ wþ Xinþ ai;aijXi  Normalð0;r2aÞ
where Xi represents time averages of the explanatory variables. The
CRE model is preferred over alternative methods such as the fixed
effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models in the case of non-
linear models (Wooldridge, 2010). However, for comparison, we
estimate the linear model with household FE given its suggested
conceptual robustness over nonlinear models such as the Probit
and Tobit (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
Consistent with the CRE model, the determinants of the fertil-
izer purchase decision and the level of use are estimated using
pooled Probit and pooled Tobit regressions, respectively. Each
regression equation includes a set of explanatory variables as well
as the time averages of the explanatory variables. A Wald test of
joint significance of the time average variables is performed to test
whether a traditional random effects model would be appropriate.
A dummy variable for the time period is included to account for
time-specific factors that affect fertilizer demand.in Sub-Saharan Africa: Telling myth from facts. Food Policy (2016), http://
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biases due to time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, conditional
strict exogeneity implies there is no endogeneity after controlling
for the time-invariant unobservables. If this assumption fails our
estimates might be biased. To minimize any remaining bias from
time-varying unobservables, we include various observable char-
acteristics to proxy for a number of unobservables. Conditional
on the covariates used, the likely major source of endogeneity
should be time invariant and thus addressed by the CRE approach
(corroborated with FE results). However, since it is not possible to
completely rule out endogeneity due to time-varying unobserv-
ables, these results are interpreted as correlates rather than causal
effects.
As an alternative specification, we also consider the likelihood
that the decision to work in RNFI, sell crops, or take a loan might
be jointly made with the decision to use fertilizer. A farmer may
decide to engage in non-farm activities (or take a loan or sell some
of his crops) to get cash to purchase inputs including fertilizer. Fur-
thermore, the joint decision process could be due to unobserved
characteristics that determine both non-farm participation (taking
a loan and selling crops) and input use such as labor availability
and networks. Consequently we estimate a seemingly unrelated
multivariate Probit regression. Given the non-linearity of our out-
come variables and the recursive structure of the model, we do not
face the classical identification issue common in linear SUR (Wilde,
2000; Smale et al., 2016). This system approach offers an efficiency
gain by taking into account correlations among the residuals of the
equations in a system of equations capturing the binary decisionsTable 9
Summary statistics of variables used in the regression analysis, Nigeria, South, North. Sou
Variables Nige
2010
Household head is Male (0/1) 88
Age of the household head (years) 51
Household dependency ratio 1.1
Household head has formal education (0/1) 60
Household resides in an urban area (0/1) 13
Land holding size (hectares) 0.9
Agricultural assets index 0.3
A household member is engaged in Non-Farm self-employment (0/1) 56
A household member is engaged in off Farm wage employment (0/1) 23
Household received any loan (0/1) 39
Household received loan from formal source (0/1) 3
Household received loan from informal source (0/1) 18
Household received loan from friends or relatives (0/1) 28
Value of sales per ha of land cultivated (in 000 Naira) 43
Use fertilizer (0/1) 45
Purchase Fertilizer (0/1) 41
Fertilizer price (in Naira per kg) 85
Distance to Nearest Market (km) 71
Coefficient of variation of rainfall 94
Share of land cultivated allocated to grains crops 43
Share of land cultivated allocated to legumes crops 16
Share of land cultivated allocated to tubers crops 28
Share of land cultivated allocated to oil crops 3
Share of land cultivated allocated to horticulture crops 7
Share of land cultivated allocated to cotton 0
Share of land cultivated allocated to tobacco 0
Share of land cultivated allocated to tea/coffee 0
Share of land cultivated allocated to other crops 3
Geographic zones
North central 17
North east 20
North west 22
South east 20
South south 13
South west 9
Note: Means of binary variables are expressed in percentage.
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participate in non-farm wage employment, take a loan, and sell
crops).
As in the single equation estimations, we control for specific
time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity and include time-
varying covariates.
The explanatory variables used in the models and their levels
are reported in Table 9. The variable sets and key descriptive points
are as follows.
First, three (potential) sources of input finance are included in
the model: (1) a dummy variable for RNFI, including self-
employment and wage employment; (2) crop sales per hectare of
land; and (3) a dummy variable for any member of the household
having taken a loan the year before the survey period. Table 9
shows that around 60% of households have at least one member
in RNFI self-employment and around 20% with a member with
wage employment. The RNFI patterns are similar in the North
and South. Table 10 shows that together they are about three-
quarters of rural household cash income in 2012. Crop sales in
the South were more than double those in the North. In both
regions they average about a quarter of cash incomes. Note from
Table 10 that livestock sales and remittances are tiny compared
with these other sources. Also note that the cash levels of the credit
transactions for external inputs are very low compared to cash
incomes.
Second, we included several socio-economic variables (gender,
age, and education of the household head, as well as the depen-
dency ratio and distance from the market) to proxy for systematicrce: Generated by authors using LSMS data.
ria South North
2012 2010 2012 2010 2012
87 76 74 96 96
52 56 57 47 49
1 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.1
60 71 70 52 53
12 18 17 10 8
0.8 0.5 0.4 1.2 1
0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3
60 51 57 60 62
18 24 23 23 15
40 36 42 42 39
5 3 8 3 3
19 18 24 18 16
29 22 26 33 30
43 65 69 30 30
45 25 21 59 61
42 23 20 55 56
103 93 106 80 100
70 66 66 75 73
95 68 68 111 112
44 15 16 59 59
17 1 1 25 25
25 58 53 10 10
3 5 6 2 2
8 15 18 3 3
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
3 7 7 1 0
17 0 0 29 27
20 0 0 34 34
24 0 0 37 40
19 49 49 0 0
13 31 32 0 0
7 21 19 0 0
in Sub-Saharan Africa: Telling myth from facts. Food Policy (2016), http://
Table 10
Sources of cash income in Nigeria, North, and South, 2012. Source: Generated by authors using LSMS data
Income sources Household cash sources (000 naira) Share of cash from each source (%)
Nigeria South North Nigeria South North
Cash income
Profit from household enterprises 119.9 110.2 127 46.2 38.0 53.5
Wage income 77.7 105.4 57.3 29.9 36.3 24.1
Crop sales (gross) 60 71.4 51.7 23.1 24.6 21.8
Livestock net sales 1 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.4
Remittances 1.1 2 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.2
Total cash 259.6 290.1 237.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
Inputs credit transactions 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.03 0.3
Inputs non credit transactions 10.8 4.2 15.6 4.2 1.4 6.6
Total input purchase 11.1 4.2 16.2 4.3 1.4 6.8
Hired labor value for harvest only 12.9 7.5 16.9 5.0 2.6 7.1
Imputed value of own crop output 140.5 88.7 178.6 54.1 30.6 75.3
Note: The numbers in the left panel are zero-in averages. The shares on the right are based on ratio of number on the left to the total cash value. Inputs include fertilizer, seeds,
and pesticides. For each value in the table, instead of deleting outliers we winsorized them i.e. replace top 10% values by the highest value within 90% of the distributions, thus
creating a pile up at the top without changing the distribution (Cox, 2006).
For imputation of value of own crop output method, we estimate unit prices of crops for crops that were sold, and then we use the median price in the local governments and
multiply by harvest quantities to get the value of crop sales.
The harvest labor for planting activities is missing in the 2010 dataset, and therefore we focus on the harvest labor only in both years.
The values reported for the cash sources are nominal values for each year.
S.G. Adjognon et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 9differences in resource access, transaction costs, productive struc-
ture, and the number of years of experience in farming (Feder et al.,
1985).
Third, we included household-level asset variables, in particu-
lar, farm size and agricultural quasi-fixed assets (tractor, plow, irri-
gation pump, and so on). The latter were captured using an asset
index computed using the principal component analysis approach
(Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). Note from Table 9 that the farms in
the North are roughly double the size of those in the South.
Fourth, we included shares of crop types in the cropped area of
the farm. In general, there is much more grain cropping and much
less tuber and horticulture cropping in the North compared with
the South. This is roughly correlated with rainfall levels.
To account for zone and region effects, we include the following
sets of variables.
First, we have dummy variables representing the six main zones
(Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southcentral, and Southwest),
reflecting different infrastructural and growing conditions. Also
at a broad level, we have a dummy for urban versus rural areas
(as there is farming by households classed in urban areas). In addi-
tion to the overall (country level) analysis, we estimate regional-
level parameters for the Northern and Southern regions (the sub-
regions as noted above). As mentioned by Oseni and Winters
(2009), there are important cultural and socio-economic differ-
ences between the two regions which can affect the way farmers
respond to changes in determinants of inputs use. Table 9 shows
that compared to the South, the north of Nigeria is more rural
and traditional, with larger household sizes, greater poverty, and
less education.
Second, we have several variables at a more disaggregate level,
the LGA (the ‘‘local government area”). These include the price of
fertilizer, and agricultural productivity risk. The latter is captured
by the coefficient of variation of rainfall in the LGA, hypothesized
to reduce the demand for fertilizer, especially in the absence of
ex-post risk mitigation opportunities and lack of credit and insur-
ance mechanisms (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011).7 This is supported by our data as non-farm wage employment participants supply
statistically significantly lower amount of labor a week, on average to agriculture
(11.12 h) than non-participants (18.24) with a p value of 0.000.4.2. Regression results
Tables 11a and 11b present the average partial effects of the
determinants of fertilizer purchase overall in Nigeria and by region
from the pooled Probit and pooled Tobit estimates. The CRE and FEPlease cite this article in press as: Adjognon, S.G., et al. Agricultural input credit
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fertilizer demand. However, they reveal substantial differences
between northern and southern Nigeria. Most relevant determi-
nants of fertilizer purchases show higher significance in the North
compared to the South. This possibly reflects the North using more
fertilizer and therefore is more responsive to various determinants
than the South.
We find that participation in non-farm self-employment has
positive and significant effects on fertilizer purchases. The esti-
mated APE (Average Partial Effects) indicates that participation in
it raises the likelihood of purchasing fertilizer by about 7%. This
result is consistent across both the South (10% increase) and the
North (5%). These findings coincide generally with the descriptive
findings above, and corroborate earlier findings of nonfarm income
on input purchase, such as Adesina (1996) for Ivory Coast and
Oseni and Winters (2009) for Nigeria. However, contrary to Oseni
and Winters (2009), we find that wage employment did not appear
as a significant determinant of fertilizer purchase and even has a
negative coefficient, perhaps due to wage employment drawing
members away from the farm area and thus competing with farm-
ing (as Smale et al., 2016 hypothesizes)7. Moreover, neither RNFI
variable is a significant determinant of the amounts of fertilizer pur-
chased, according to the Tobit results. The balance between farm and
non-farm competition for resources on one hand, and the relaxation
of cash constraints to allow financing of agriculture inputs on the
other hand, determine the observed effects of non-farm employ-
ment. In our case, they seem to cancel each other out, especially
when we look at the effect on fertilizer amounts.
While lagged access to loans positively affects fertilizer pur-
chase, the effect is significant only in the North. A closer investiga-
tion of the types of loans taken by farmers shows that loans from
friends and relatives (rather than loan from formal and semi-
formal institutions) drive most of these results (with the regres-
sions using different kinds of loans as explanatory variables not
shown in the tables). This could illustrate the fact that loans, and
in particular loans from formal and semi-formal institutions, are
limited for agricultural investment. Given the risks related to agri-
cultural activities, formal and semi-formal credit suppliers arein Sub-Saharan Africa: Telling myth from facts. Food Policy (2016), http://
Table 11a
Estimation results of determinants of fertilizer purchase (0/1) decision. Source: Generated by authors using LSMS data.
Variables Nigeria South North
CRE Probit Linear FE CRE Probit Linear FE CRE Probit Linear FE
Household head is Male (0/1) 0.050⁄ 0.115 0.026 0.010 0.131⁄⁄⁄ 0.637⁄⁄
[0.058] [0.177] [0.355] [0.861] [0.004] [0.049]
Age of the household head (years) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
[0.740] [0.725] [0.654] [0.784] [0.876] [0.716]
Household dependency ratio 0.006 0.012 0.030 0.028 0.030⁄ 0.034⁄
[0.669] [0.446] [0.169] [0.225] [0.052] [0.081]
Household head has formal education (0/1) 0.081⁄⁄⁄ 0.051⁄⁄ 0.056⁄⁄ 0.040 0.094⁄⁄⁄ 0.057⁄⁄
[0.000] [0.041] [0.046] [0.521] [0.000] [0.035]
Land holding size (hectares) 0.017 0.026⁄ 0.033 0.013 0.031⁄⁄ 0.037⁄⁄
[0.220] [0.057] [0.260] [0.603] [0.036] [0.020]
Agricultural asset index 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002
[0.267] [0.323] [0.403] [0.576] [0.349] [0.315]
Total Livestock Units index 0.652⁄⁄ 0.413 0.649 0.355 0.651⁄ 0.349
[0.049] [0.158] [0.656] [0.536] [0.080] [0.257]
LOG of crop sales in naira per ha of harvested land 0.001+ 0.001⁄ 0.000 0.000 0.001⁄ 0.001⁄⁄
[0.114] [0.071] [0.623] [0.597] [0.083] [0.049]
A household member is engaged in Non-Farm Self-employment (1/0) 0.070⁄⁄ 0.078⁄⁄⁄ 0.106⁄⁄ 0.135⁄⁄⁄ 0.052+ 0.062⁄
[0.012] [0.009] [0.020] [0.009] [0.149] [0.078]
A household member is engaged in wage employment (1/0) 0.022 0.019 0.025 0.022 0.006 0.004
[0.418] [0.545] [0.505] [0.595] [0.876] [0.918]
A household member took a loan (0/1) 0.056⁄⁄⁄ 0.060⁄⁄⁄ 0.045 0.047 0.069⁄⁄⁄ 0.076⁄⁄⁄
[0.009] [0.001] [0.203] [0.163] [0.009] [0.001]
Coefficient of variation of rainfall 0.003⁄⁄⁄ 0.003 0.004⁄⁄⁄
[0.001] [0.623] [0.000]
LOG of fertilizer price in Naira per kg 0.017 0.019 0.015 0.003 0.017 0.033
[0.616] [0.481] [0.729] [0.920] [0.737] [0.438]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to grains crops 0.002 0.003⁄ 0.000 0.000 0.004⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄
[0.171] [0.061] [0.813] [0.711] [0.047] [0.047]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to legumes crops 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003+ 0.002
[0.492] [0.173] [0.478] [0.829] [0.138] [0.199]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to tubers crops 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004⁄ 0.002
[0.560] [0.207] [0.766] [0.217] [0.072] [0.179]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to oil crops 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
[0.558] [0.267] [0.809] [0.979] [0.560] [0.981]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to horticulture crops 0.002⁄ 0.003⁄ 0.001 0.001 0.004⁄ 0.003+
[0.092] [0.052] [0.360] [0.380] [0.091] [0.123]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to cotton 0.002 0.001
[0.387] [0.774]
Urban dummy variable (0/1) 0.089⁄⁄⁄ 0.096 0.092⁄⁄⁄ 0.118 0.050 0.143
[0.005] [0.701] [0.008] [0.189] [0.252] [0.607]
Household Distance in (KMs) to Nearest Market 0.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.003⁄⁄⁄ 0.006
[0.000] [0.771] [0.454] [0.990] [0.000] [0.259]
Year 2010 (0/1) 0.017 0.017 0.029 0.054⁄⁄⁄ 0.005 0.005
[0.237] [0.191] [0.154] [0.004] [0.784] [0.767]
Zone dummies
North east 0.095⁄ 0.071
[0.057] [0.185]
North west 0.324⁄⁄⁄ 0.310⁄⁄⁄
[0.000] [0.000]
South east 0.165⁄⁄⁄ 0.255⁄⁄⁄
[0.006] [0.000]
South center 0.229⁄⁄⁄ 0.169⁄⁄
[0.002] [0.011]
South west 0.400⁄⁄⁄
[0.000]
Constant 0.339 0.168 0.231
[0.662] [0.875] [0.669]
Number of observations 4843 4843 1670 1670 3173 3173
R-squared 0.027 0.045 0.037
Number of households 2730 995 1735
Note: ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄, and + indicate that the corresponding regression coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, respectively. Model estimated using
partial MLE estimation method. P values based on clustered standard errors between brackets. CRE stands for Correlated Random Effects while FE stands for Fixed Effects.
10 S.G. Adjognon et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxreluctant to provide loans for agricultural purposes, as they fear
higher risk of default. Although we could not test specifically this
hypothesis in Nigeria due to data limitations, as we noted above,
the data for Malawi and Tanzania show that consumption and
investment in business start-ups are by far the primary purposes
of the loans taken by households. Besides, the fact that the effect
of loan is significant only in the North could be explained by thePlease cite this article in press as: Adjognon, S.G., et al. Agricultural input credit
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.014dominant sources of loans in each region. Friends and relatives
seem to be a dominant source of loans taken by households in
the North compared with the South. Our analysis of the loan data
in Nigeria from the LSMS (not shown in a table) provides some evi-
dence for this. There are 22–26% of households reporting loans
from friends and relatives in the South, compared to 30–33% in
the North.in Sub-Saharan Africa: Telling myth from facts. Food Policy (2016), http://
Table 11b
Estimation results of determinants of quantity of fertilizers purchased by farmers in Nigeria. Source: Generated by authors using LSMS data.
Variables Nigeria South North
CRE Tobit Linear FE CRE Tobit Linear FE CRE Tobit Linear FE
Household head is Male (0/1) 65.803⁄⁄⁄ 139.042⁄⁄ 20.022 11.096 109.283⁄⁄⁄ 346.443⁄⁄
[0.003] [0.032] [0.333] [0.870] [0.007] [0.038]
Age of the household head (years) 0.086 1.871 0.220 0.828 0.319 2.984
[0.802] [0.297] [0.698] [0.619] [0.462] [0.200]
Household dependency ratio 0.941 4.056 24.422 10.978 11.982 0.741
[0.935] [0.847] [0.184] [0.727] [0.414] [0.978]
Household head has formal education (0/1) 31.943⁄⁄ 1.798 43.532⁄⁄ 8.492 29.495⁄ 9.200
[0.014] [0.953] [0.032] [0.910] [0.079] [0.782]
Land holding size (hectares) 49.135⁄⁄⁄ 111.516⁄⁄⁄ 44.826⁄ 81.532⁄⁄⁄ 59.393⁄⁄⁄ 117.974⁄⁄⁄
[0.000] [0.000] [0.051] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Agricultural asset index 1.779⁄ 1.372 1.948 0.838 1.721+ 0.915
[0.063] [0.228] [0.405] [0.511] [0.113] [0.599]
Total Livestock Units index 794.160⁄⁄⁄ 890.156⁄⁄ 254.360 174.590 843.723⁄⁄⁄ 833.816⁄⁄
[0.001] [0.012] [0.832] [0.812] [0.002] [0.022]
LOG of crop sales in naira per ha of harvested land 0.277 0.046 0.048 0.164 0.531 0.433
[0.536] [0.940] [0.936] [0.859] [0.402] [0.571]
A household member is engaged in Non-Farm Self-employment (1/0) 16.582 12.894 57.657+ 2.836 7.946 5.306
[0.484] [0.750] [0.144] [0.965] [0.798] [0.917]
A household member is engaged in wage employment (1/0) 85.647 12.824 12.627 16.299 16.685 31.760
[0.796] [0.690] [0.702] [0.779] [0.490] [0.404]
A household member took a loan (0/1) 15.764 3.137 32.709 44.667 14.671 4.289
[0.341] [0.893] [0.218] [0.234] [0.479] [0.884]
Coefficient of variation of rainfall 2.147⁄⁄⁄ 4.164 2.568⁄⁄⁄
[0.000] [0.356] [0.000]
LOG of fertilizer price in Naira per kg 31.291 56.164⁄⁄ 35.938 60.673⁄⁄ 28.953 64.421+
[0.208] [0.024] [0.293] [0.041] [0.437] [0.114]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to grains crops 1.088 18.904⁄⁄⁄ 0.008 1.120+ 2.802⁄ 18.990⁄⁄⁄
[0.224] [0.005] [0.993] [0.147] [0.074] [0.004]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to legumes crops 1.019 19.196⁄⁄⁄ 0.926 0.400 2.504+ 18.899⁄⁄⁄
[0.301] [0.005] [0.488] [0.685] [0.111] [0.005]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to tubers crops 0.809 19.181⁄⁄⁄ 0.001 0.121 2.074 18.070⁄⁄⁄
[0.375] [0.004] [0.999] [0.805] [0.167] [0.006]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to oil crops 1.286 19.935⁄⁄⁄ 0.665 1.016 1.557 18.326⁄⁄⁄
[0.228] [0.003] [0.526] [0.250] [0.413] [0.005]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to horticulture crops 1.623⁄ 19.315⁄⁄⁄ 0.956 0.116 2.441 18.318⁄⁄⁄
[0.078] [0.004] [0.318] [0.802] [0.161] [0.006]
Share of total land cultivated allocated to cotton 7.072⁄⁄⁄ 7.280⁄⁄
[0.009] [0.041]
Urban dummy variable (0/1) 48.053⁄⁄ 229.742 57.901⁄⁄ 99.588+ 18.113 255.808
[0.012] [0.339] [0.019] [0.146] [0.426] [0.344]
Household Distance in (KMs) to Nearest Market 1.074⁄⁄⁄ 1.853 0.435 3.524 1.208⁄⁄⁄ 2.646
[0.000] [0.538] [0.302] [0.326] [0.000] [0.544]
Year 2010 (0/1) 20.286⁄ 10.804 39.974⁄⁄⁄ 92.170⁄⁄⁄ 1.296 30.360
[0.070] [0.559] [0.009] [0.000] [0.938] [0.265]
Zone dummies 72.740⁄⁄⁄ 54.593⁄
[0.009] [0.072]
North east 179.017⁄⁄⁄ 172.165⁄⁄⁄
[0.000] [0.000]
North west 32.435 211.842⁄⁄⁄
[0.425] [0.000]
South east 155.953⁄⁄⁄ 105.926⁄⁄
[0.003] [0.021]
South center 241.589⁄⁄⁄
[0.000]
South west 1551.668⁄⁄ 89.799 1654.857⁄⁄
[0.031] [0.755] [0.031]
Number of observations 4843 4843 1670 1670 3173 3173
R-squared 0.059 0.050 0.083
Number of households 2730 995 1735
Note: ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄, ⁄, and + indicate that the corresponding regression coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, respectively. Model estimated using
partial MLE estimation method. P values based on clustered standard errors between brackets.
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strongly negative effect on fertilizer purchase, but this is only sig-
nificant in the North. This result is important as investments in
modern input use though generally profitable, are costly and can
yield very low (or even negative) returns in case of negative
weather shocks.
Other factors that significantly affect fertilizer purchase are as
expected such as education of the household head with a positivePlease cite this article in press as: Adjognon, S.G., et al. Agricultural input credit
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.014and significant effect in both the North and the South. The farm
size effect is significant and positive only in the North, while it is
negative but not significant in the South. Crop sales affect posi-
tively, but not significantly, the fertilizer purchase decision.
The results of the seemingly unrelated regressions (available
upon request from authors, given space limitation) are also consis-
tent with the single equation results. Both the household and geo-
graphical factors that affect demand and more importantly thein Sub-Saharan Africa: Telling myth from facts. Food Policy (2016), http://
12 S.G. Adjognon et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxpositive effect of non-farm self-employment and loans on fertilizer
use are maintained. However, the unexplained portions of the fer-
tilizer purchase equation and the other sources of cash (including
self-employment, crop sales and taking a loan) were not correlated
for the most part suggesting that these decisions are not necessar-
ily made jointly and thus appropriately modeled using the single
equation CRE and FE.5. Conclusions
Many believe that SSA farmers’ increasing their purchase of
external inputs such as fertilizer, seed, and pesticides can bring a
welcome increase in yields. It has also been observed (Sheahan
and Barrett, 2014), and echoed in our paper, that the purchase of
these external inputs is definitely no longer absent in SSA and is
even very prevalent in some countries, contrary to the common
perception. There had not been a systematic exploration of how
farmers are paying for these inputs – in particular, what were
the relative roles of two sources of cash to pay for inputs (inter alia)
– credit (informal and formal) and own cash income. This paper
systematically delved into nationally representative datasets for
four countries in SSA with widely varying characteristics (Malawi,
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda) and examined the roles of these
sources.
While the literature emphasized that with the reduction or
elimination of parastatal agrarian banks formal bank credit is sel-
dom or never available to Sub-Saharan African farmers for inputs,
there was explicitly or implicitly in the literature the working
hypothesis that farmers used traditional tied credit with output
and input traders, and other sources of informal credit to finance
their purchase of external inputs for non-contract farming situa-
tions. For cash contract-farming situations and cash cropping in
general, the working hypothesis in much of the literature is that
processors front inputs or cash for inputs to farmers.
By and large, our paper contradicted these ‘‘common wisdoms”
concerning the use and role of credit in input purchase. First, we
found that very few farmers use any form of credit, formal or infor-
mal to finance external input purchase. Second, we found that
‘‘tied” credit-output relations are very rare and very minor in
external inputs, but especially among smaller farmers in poorer
places. What is still significant is tied labor-output markets where
local workers advance labor and are paid at the harvest, largely
ignored in the literature. Third, we found that generally ‘‘tradi-
tional cash crop farmers” rarely receive credit from processors,
except in a few enclaves like larger tobacco farmers in Tanzania.
Furthermore, we found econometrically that nonfarm self-
employment (but not wage employment) plays a significant and
positive role in inputs purchase decision, especially given the lim-
ited availability of credit for agricultural purposes. It appears that
farmers use loans to start nonfarm enterprises (and finance con-
sumption) and plow back the cash partly into their farm input
needs; an important observation worthy of further exploration.
These findings do not reflect on or test whether farmers face
credit constraints; the fact that farmers use very little credit, infor-
mal or formal, for farm inputs, does not inform researchers or pol-
icymakers whether the farmers have too little access to credit.
What we can say from the data is that nonfarm employment is pro-
viding a major source of cash that currently far eclipses use of
credit for inputs purchases. When farmers take loans, they mainly
use the funds to start nonfarm enterprises or finance consumption.
They then often use nonfarm income cash to buy farm inputs. That
appears to imply that farmers see that employment as a crucial
cash source to meet their farm needs. Further rigorous analysis is
necessary to confirm this but it implies that rural development
policies and programs that spur broad development of the ruralPlease cite this article in press as: Adjognon, S.G., et al. Agricultural input credit
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.014nonfarm sector, in manufacture and services, could benefit farm
input purchase and thus productivity and food security, and cer-
tainly be an important complement to credit policies and
programs.
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